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Abstract
Selling train tickets has evolved in the last ten years from queuing in the railway sta-
tion, to buying tickets on the internet and printing them. Both alternatives are still
viable options, though they are time consuming or need printing devices. Nowa-
days it is essential to offer a service that is as fast and efficient as possible: mobile
phones provide an accessible, affordable and widely available tool for supplying
information and transferring data.
The goal of this project is to design a train ticket contained in a SMS message.
While there are several challenges related to the project, the main one is the security
and how we can digitally sign a train ticket that is contained in 160 characters.
The solution offered in this project is the implementation of the MOVA Signature
(from the name of the inventors MOnnerat and VAudenay) that uses an interactive
verification and therefore allows signature of 20 bits (roughly 4 characters).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1976, when Diffie and Hellman published their paper on public cryptosystem
[6], they explained the concept of digital signature that corresponds for the elec-
tronic world to the handwritten signature. To implement a digital signature we use
asymmetric cryptography with one private key and one public key. The private key
used to decrypt or sign a message is different from the public one used to encrypt
or verify, though both are related through a mathematical function; additionally,
finding the private key on the basis of the public one must require complex calcu-
lations that cannot be realized in a reasonable time. In general the Signer uses his
private key to sign the object and then anyone can use the public key to verify the
validity of the signature. This system offers authentication by guaranteeing that
the sender is the person he pretends to be and integrity by guaranteeing that the
receiver gets what the sender has sent.
In 1989, Chaum and van Antwerpen proposed Undeniable Signatures [3] as a
system that would not be universally verifiable (verifiable just by having the public
key), but that would necessitate an interactive protocol between the Signer and the
Verifier to be able to confirm or deny a signature.
In 2004, Monnerat and Vaudenay proposed an undeniable signature scheme
named MOVA [9] that has the particularity to generate very short signatures while
still maintaining a high security.
Switzerland is well known for its efficient railway service which is reliable and
punctual though nor very fast. Tickets bought on board are taxed with a penalty
fine, which leaves passengers with the options of queuing at the station, buying the
tickets through internet and printing them, or receiving the tickets by MMS.
MMS is a protocol that allows to send/receive rich media up to several kilobytes
on a cell phone and extends the SMS system which is limited to 140 bytes. The
MMS service uses the data connection of the cellphone and therefore works only
on modern phones with operators that support this protocol and of course is much
more expensive (especially while roaming) than SMS.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Mathematical Background
To understand the rest of the paper, we will first have to define some mathematical
concepts:
2.1.1 Algorithmic Complexity
Definition 1 (Negligible) A function f : N → R+ is called negligible (negl(·)) if
for any polynomial p : N → R+ there exists an integer n0 such that n ≥ n0 ⇒
f(n) < 1p(n) .
Definition 2 (Efficient) An algorithm is said to be efficient if its running time is
bounded by a polynomial of the size of its inputs. Conversely, an operation is said
to be efficient if it is carried by an efficient algorithm.
2.1.2 Groups
A group (G, ∗) is an algebraic structure defined as a set G together with a binary
operation ∗: G ∗G→ G. We write “a ∗ b” for the result of applying the operation
∗ on the two elements a and b of G. To have a group, ∗ must satisfy the following
axioms:
• Closure ∀a, b ∈ G : a ∗ b ∈ G.
• Associativity ∀a, b, c ∈ G : (a ∗ b) ∗ c = a ∗ (b ∗ c).
• Identity element ∃e ∈ G : ∀a ∈ G, e ∗ a = a = a ∗ e.
• Inverse element ∀a ∈ G, ∃b ∈ G : a ∗ b = e = b ∗ a (where e is the identity
element).
3
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2.1.3 Group Homomorphism
Given two groups (G, ∗) and (H, ·), a group homomorphism from (G, ∗) to (H, ·)
is a function h : G→ H such that ∀a, b ∈ G : h(a ∗ b) = h(a) · h(b).
Definition 3 (Interpolation) Given two groups (G, ∗) and (H, ·), and a subset
S := {(x1, y1) . . . (xs, ys)} ⊆ G×H , we say that the set of points S interpolates
in a group homomorphism if there exists a group homomorphism h : G→ H such
that h(xi) = yi, ∀i = 1, . . . , s.
Given A ⊆ G × H and B ⊆ G × H , we say that A interpolates in a group
homomorphism with B if A ∪B interpolates in a group homomorphism.
n-S-Group Homomorphism Interpolation Problem
n-S-GHI problems uses two groups G and H , a set of points S ⊆ G × H and a
positive integer n. Given x1, . . . , xn chosen randomly, the Problem is to compute
y1, . . . , yn ∈ H such that (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) interpolates with S in a group
homomorphism.
n-S-Group Homomorphism Interpolation Decisional Problem
n-S-GHID problem uses two groups G and H , a set of points S ⊆ G × H and a
positive integer n. The problem is to decide if an instance I is generated by a set of
points (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) ∈ X × Y chosen at random such that it interpolates
with S in a group homomorphism or is generated by randomly choosing n couples
in (G×H)n.
Definition 4 (H-generation of G) Let two groups G and H with x1, . . . , xn ∈ G
and y1, . . . , yn ∈ H , we say that x1, . . . , xn H-generate of G if there exists at most
one homomorphic function h such that
∀i = 1, . . . , n, h(xi) = yi
Definition 5 (Expert Group Knowledge) LetG andH be two groups, let d be the
cardinality of H , and the set S = {x1, . . . , xn} ∈ Gn, such that they H-generate
G. We say an algorithm has an Expert Group Knowledge of G with the set S if it is
able to find for a random x ∈ G coefficients a1, . . . , an ∈ Zd and r ∈ G such that
x = dr + a1x1 + . . .+ asxs
2.2 Cryptographic notions
We will now see some Cryptographic definitions and properties that will be used
later on in the paper
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2.2.1 Statistical Distances and Distinguishers
Definition 6 (Statistical Distance) The statistical distance ∆ between two dis-
crete random variables X1 and X2 is defined as:
∆(X1, X2) :=
1
2
∑
x
(|Pr[X1 = x]− Pr[X2 = x]|)
Definition 7 (Distinguisher) Given two distributions X0 and X1, a distinguisher,
denoted D hereafter, is an algorithm given either X0 or X1, chosen randomly,
which tries to guess which of the two is given.
Concretely, we consider the following success probability
|Pr[D(1k, X0) = 1]− Pr[D(1k, X1) = 1]|,
for which we consider several cases:
1. if the probability is equal to 0, we say that X0 and X1 are perfectly indistin-
guishable.
2. if the probability is lower than some value , we say that X0 and X1 are
-statistically indistinguishable.
3. if the probability is negligible in k and D is polynomially bounded in k, we
say that X0 and X1 are computationally indistinguishable.
2.2.2 Pseudorandom Generator
Pseudorandom generator defines a deterministic procedure that takes as parameter
a seed s (that can be random) and produces an output sequence that is indistin-
guishable from a truly random sequence.
2.2.3 One-way Functions
Definition 8 (One-way and Trapdoor-one-way functions) A function f : G →
H is said to be one-way if it is efficiently computable, i.e., given x ∈ G, computing
y = f(x) is efficient. However, inverting the function is “hard”, in the sense that
∀A,Pr[a← A(1k, b)|b = f(a)] = negl(k)
whereA is polynomially bounded and the probability is taken over the randomness
of A and the random choice of a.
If there exists some secret information s for which the invertibility of f becomes
efficient, we say that f is a trapdoor-one-way function.
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2.2.4 Hash Function
A hash function is an efficiently calculable function h : {0; 1}∗ → {0; 1}h that
reduces a message of an arbitrary length to a given length that has these proprieties:
• Preimage Resistance: given y ∈ {0; 1}h it is difficult to calculate x such as
f(x) = y.
• Second Preimage Resistance: given x1 it is difficult to find x2 (with x1 6= x2)
such as f(x1) = f(x2).
• Collision Resistance: it is difficult to find x1, x2 such that f(x1) = f(x2).
2.2.5 Commitment Scheme
A Commitment Scheme is a protocol in which one generates a commitment value
from a data that binds him to not change it but that does not reveal information
about the data. The commitment then can later be opened to reveal the data. A
Commitment Scheme is defined by: a message (data) m ∈M in the space of mes-
sages; a commitment c ∈ C in the space of Commitments; a decommitment d ∈ D
in the space of Decommitment (that can reveal the committed data); a committing
algorithm Commit and an opening algorithm Open that are used below:
• Commit(m) → (c, d) the probabilistic commitment algorithm generates
from the message m a commitment c and a decommitment d.
• Open(m, c, d) → (true or false) the usually deterministic Open algorithm
verifies if m is a valid message for the given commitment c and decommit-
ment d.
A commitment Scheme should have the following:
• Completeness: if the Commiter and the Opener behave as specified, the
opener always accepts the proof:
Pr[Open(m, c, d)→ true|Commit(m)→ true] = 1
• Binding Property: one cannot produce two distinct messages m,m′, two de-
commitment values d, d′, one commitment value c such thatOpen(m, c, d)→
true and Open(m′, c, d′)→ true.
Concretely, we consider the following success probability
Pr[Open(m′, c, d′)→ true|(c, d)← Commit(m),m′ 6= m]
for which we consider several cases:
1. if the probability is equal to 1|M | we say that the commitment function
is perfectly binding.
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2. if the probability is lower than some value  we say that the commit-
ment function is -statistically binding.
3. if the probability is negligible in k andCommit is polynomially bounded
in k, we say that the commitment function is computationally binding.
• Hiding Property: For any messagem the commitment c generated byCommit(m)→
(c, d) does not leak any information concerning m.
Concretely, we consider the following success probability
Pr[m← A(c)|((c, d)← commit(m))]
for which we consider several cases:
1. if the probability is equal to 1|M | we say that the commitment function
is perfectly hiding.
2. if the probability is lower than some value  we say that the commit-
ment function is -statistically hiding.
3. if the probability is negligible in k andCommit is polynomially bounded
in k, we say that the commitment function is computationally hiding.
2.2.6 Random Oracles
Random Oracles are ideal objects that implement a uniformly distributed ran-
dom function from the set X to the set Y , RO : X → Y such as that for x ∈
X,RO(x) = y ∈ Y where y is a random value. If the same value x is given to the
Oracle then the same value y will be outputted. Random Oracles are usually used
to prove security in system (the system is then called secure in the random oracle
model).
2.2.7 Digital Signatures
A digital signature scheme consist of a message mess in the message space M , a
signature sig in the signature space S, private key Ks,a public key Kp, a Genera-
tion algorithm Gen with some parameters Param, k; a signing algorithm Sign and
a verification algorithm Verif that are used a follow:
• Generation: the generation of the pair of keys is done by the probabilistic
function Gen(Param, 1k)→ (Ks,Kp).
• Signing: the signature of the message is done by the probabilistic function
Sign(mess,Ks)→ sig.
• The verification of the signature returns true or false if (mess, sig) is valid
with respect to the key pair (Ks,Kp) or not with the (generally) deterministic
function Verif:
Verif(mess, sig,Kp)→ (true or false)
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Digital signatures offers the correctness propriety which guaranties that the
Verif algorithm returns true for any the signature generated by Sign if the correct
pair of keys has been used.
From this we can deduce some other proprieties:
• Authentication: gives the ability to the Verifier to check if the pretended
author of the message really is the author. It also guarantees to the Signer
that no one without Ks could sign the message.
• Integrity: gives the ability to the Verifier to check if the message has been
tempered between the time it has been signed and verified.
• Non-repudiation: takes away the ability of the Signer to deny a genuine
signature to a Verifier.
• Soundness: a valid signature cannot be proven false and an invalid signature
cannot be proven true.
Traditional digital signature schemes are universally verifiable meaning that
anyone can verify if a signature is correct or not by using the public key. With this
type of signature the non-repudiation is implicitly given with the authentication
and the integrity.
Security of digital signatures
When we talk about security, we generally need to distinguish between an attacker
who performs a Known Message Attack, where the attacker can have access to
messages and valid signatures form an oracle, and a Chosen Message Attack, where
the attacker can decide of messages and get a valid signatures of the messages from
the oracle.
A system that is Chosen message resistant offers a greater security than one
that is only Known message resistant.
There are several different security levels to consider while talking about sig-
natures:
• A signature is total break resistant if there is no way for an attacker to find
the private key while only knowing the public key.
• A signature is universal forgery resistant if there is no way for an attacker
to find a valid signature for a random chosen message by only knowing the
public key.
• A signature is existential forgery resistant if there is no way for an attacker
to find a valid signature for a chosen message by only knowing the public
key.
2.2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC NOTIONS 9
Interactive Proof
During an interactive proof between the Prover and the Verifier, the Prover con-
vinces the Verifier of the validity of a given statement with a proof based on a
secret. An Interactive proof can have the following proprieties:
• Zero-Knowledge: the protocol does not disclose any information about the
secret while being performed.
• Completeness: when the statement is true, the Verifier accepts the proof.
• Soundness: If the statement is false, the Prover cannot convince the Verifier
that the statement is true.
• Non-Transferability: a third-party cannot prove a statement to the Verifier
without knowing the Provers secret.
Undeniable Signatures
Undeniable signature proposed by Chaum and van Antwerpen [3] offers the ability
to the Signer to keep his signature private (and therefore not universally verifiable).
This type of signature scheme incapacitates anyone to verify a signature and to as-
sociate it to the Signer without his collaboration (it is called an invisible signature
since one needs the private key to be able to distinguish a valid from an invalid sig-
nature). The signature verification is done by an interaction between the Signer and
the Verifier, where the Signer can choose if he wants to authenticate the message
and has to prove to the Verifier if the message is genuine or not. Since a Signer
could very easily deny a valid signature, the signature must be undeniable so that
no valid signature may be denied (for that reason in the common language we call
invisible signature undeniable signature).
An Undeniable Signatures scheme consist of a message mess in the message
space M , a signature sig in the signature space S, a private key Ks, a public
key Kp, a Generation algorithm Gen with some parameters Param, k, a signing
algorithm Sign, a Confirmation interactive protocol Conf and a Denial interactive
protocol Den that are used a follow:
• Generation: the generation of the keys is done by the probabilistic function
Gen: Gen(Param, 1k)→ (Ks,Kp).
• Signing: the signature of the message is done by the signing probabilistic
function Sign: Sign(mess,Ks)→ sig.
• The Confirmation protocol of the signature returns true if (mess, sig) is
valid with respect to the key pair (Ks,Kp) else false with the function Conf:
Conf(mess, sig,Kp)→ (true or false)
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• The Denial protocol of the signature returns true if (mess, sig) is invalid
with respect to the key pair (Ks,Kp) else falsewith the function Den:Den(mess, sig,Kp)→
(true or false)
Undeniable Signatures guarantees the following properties:
• Unforgeability: a valid signature can only been generated with the knowl-
edge of the secret key.
• Soundness for confirmation: an invalid signature cannot be proven true.
• Soundness for denial: a valid signature cannot be proven false.
• Zero-Knowledge: the confirmation and the denial protocols do not disclose
any information about the secret while being performed.
• Non-Transferability: a third-party cannot prove a statement to the Verifier
without knowing the Provers secret.
• Invisibility: a third-party cannot distinguish a valid signature from an invalid
one without knowing the Ks.
2.2.8 Diffie-Hellman
The Diffie-Hellman protocol is a key agreement protocol based on the discrete log-
arithm problem [6] , that has the particularity to be done over an unsecured channel
without the two parties (Alice and Bob) having previously exchanged information.
The agreement works as follows: Alice and Bob need two prime numbers g
and p such that g is a primitive route modulo p (g and p are not secret and can
be publicly available). Alice picks a random number a and Bob a picks a random
number b. Alice then generates A = ga mod p that is sent to Bob and Bob
generates B = gb mod p that is sent to Alice. To compute the secret key k Alice
computes k = Ba mod p = (gb)a mod p and Bob computes k = Ab mod p =
(ga)b mod p.
A third person who would have listened to the agreement would only know p,
g, A and B which would not be sufficient to find the secret key k.
The Semi-static Diffie-Hellman protocol works exactly the same way as the
DH protocol except that A is given over a authenticated channel to Bob prior the
key agreement. Therefore with the Semi-static protocol, it is possible to guarantee
the authenticity of Alice.
2.2.9 AES
AES is a semetric cryptography standard based on the Rijndael cipher published
by Rijmen and Daemen [4]. It is block cipher based (128,192 or 256 bits) by using
Substitution-permutation network on each block in 10,12 or 14 rounds (depending
on the key size). Since 2001 it is an open Standard widely implemented.
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2.2.10 Modes of operation
To avoid leaking information while encrypting with block cipher we have to use
mode of operation. There exists several different mode of operation available
(ECB, CBC, OFB, and CFB) that are more or less secure. When using ECB, some-
one without the knowledge of the secret key can still detect repeating blocks. The
other modes use an Initialisation Vector (IV) and chaining between blocks to in-
crease the security and avoid this problem.
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Chapter 3
MOVA Signature Scheme
The MOVA signature Scheme has been developed by Jean Monnerat and Serge
Vaudenay and presented at Asiacrypt 2004 [9]. MOVA is an undeniable signature
scheme that has the particularity to generate very small signatures while keeping a
good security level.
3.1 Preliminaries
We will first go through some proof protocol definitions that are used in the MOVA
Scheme. The proofs and the detailed definitions can be found in [8].
3.1.1 Proof Protocol for the GHID Problem (GHIproof)
We need to define a protocol in which the Signer S can prove to the Verifier V that
a set R = (x1, y1), . . . , (xs, ys) with xi ∈ X and yi ∈ Y interpolates in the group
homomorphism H : X → Y with d= |Y |. The protocol could be done l times or
in one batch of with l values (as done underneath).
1. V randomly picks ri ∈u X and ai,j ∈u Zd for i = 1, . . . , l and j = 1, . . . , s.
He then calculates ui = dri + ai,1x1 + . . .+ ai,sxs and wi = ai,1y1 + . . .+
ai,sys for i = 1, . . . , l. He then sends to S u1, . . . , ul.
2. First, S verifies that for i = 1, . . . , l,H(xi) = yi (if the homomorphism
is valid for all values else he aborts the protocol). Secondly, he calculates
w˜i = H(ui) for i = 1, . . . , l. Thirdly S commits to the calculated values
Commit(w˜1, . . . , w˜l)→ (c, d). Finally, S sends to V the commitment com.
3. V replies with the chosen values of ri and ai,j for i = 1, . . . , l and j =
1, . . . , s to S.
4. First, S verifies that the ui = dri + ai,1x1 + . . . + ai,sxs for i = 1, . . . , l
(if the equation is valid else he aborts the protocol). Secondly, allows V to
open com by sending the w˜i for i = 1, . . . , l and de.
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5. V verifies that w˜i = wi for i = 1, . . . , l and opens the commitment with
Open(w˜1, . . . , w˜l, c, d). If the value is true the proof is valid else the proof
is rejected.
3.1.2 Proof Protocol for the co-GHID Problem (co-GHIproof)
We need to define a protocol in which the Signer S can prove to the Verifier V that a
set T = ((xˆ1, y˜1), . . . , (xˆt, y˜t)) with xˆi ∈ X and y˜i ∈ Y does not interpolate in the
group homomorphism H : X → Y . The protocol could be done l times or in one
batch of with l values (as done underneath). For the decision of non-interpolation
to be taken it is enough that only iteration is proven wrong. d is the order of Y with
smallest prime factor p and R = ((x1, y1), . . . , (xs, ys)) with xi ∈ X and yi ∈ Y
that interpolate in the group homomorphism H : X → Y .
1. Firstly, V randomly chooses ri,k ∈u X, ai,j,k ∈u Zp, λi ∈u Zp with i =
1, . . . , l, j = 1, . . . , s, k = 1, . . . , t. Secondly, V calculates for every i
and every k: ui,k = dri,k +
s∑
j=1
ai,j,kxj + λixˆk and wi,k =
s∑
j=1
ai,j,kyj +
λiy˜k. (We will consider that the set u = (u1,1, . . . , ul,t) and the set w =
(w1,1, . . . , wl,t).) Finally, V send u and w to S.
2. Firstly, S calculates for k = 1, . . . , t H(xˆk) = yˆk and checks that for one
or more k, yˆk 6= y˜k (if not the protocol is aboard). Secondly S calculates
H(ui,k) = vi,k for i = 1, . . . , l , k = 1, . . . , t. Since for at least one k,
yˆk 6= y˜k and since wi,k − vi,k = λi(y˜k − yˆk) because of H homomorphic
propriety, it is possible for S to reveal λ = (λ1, . . . , λl). (If S does not find
all the λi it means that V is not honest so S picks random values of λi).
Finally V calculates Commit(λ)→ (c, d) and sends the commitment to V .
3. V replies with all the ri,ks and ai,j,ks.
4. S verifies that the ui,k’s and the wi,k’s have been calculated correctly by
recalculating them with all the known values ri,ks and ai,j,ks. If the values
are correct he replies with λ and de else he aborts the protocol.
5. V verifies that Open(λ, c, d) → true and verifies that the λ found by S are
the correct ones, then accepts the proof, else he refuses it.
3.2 MOVA
To be able to use a signing scheme, we need to follow the following steps: gen-
erating the keys, signing the document, verifying the signature (acceptance and
denial). Below we will develop all of them.
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3.2.1 Domain Parameters
To qualify to some standards, there are some parameters Param that have to be
set: Lkey would be the key length, Lsig would be the signature length, Icon would
be the number iteration to confirm a valid signature and Iden would be the number
of iterations to deny a signature. We first choose two groups Xgroup and Ygroup
(with d as the cardinality of Ygroup) with a homomorphism h function between
them (the two groups and the homomorphic function can be completely defined by
their parameters: Xp, Yp, Hp); we also need 2 pseudorandom number Generators
PRNGk and PRNGs function (that are modelled by random oracles and defined by
their seed) that takes an element from M (such as a seed k ∈ M ) then generates a
given number of element in the group Xgroup.
3.2.2 The keys generation scheme
The key generation is an operation that only has to be done once by the Signer from
which he will produce a private key (Ks) that he will keep for himself and a public
key (Kp) that he will be able to widely distribute.
1. S selects aXgroup and a Ygroup with an group homomorphism h : Xgroup →
Ygroup and computes the order d of Ygroup.
2. S randomly chooses a seed k and calculatesPRNGk(k)→ (x1, . . . , xLkey) =
Xgen.
3. S calculates h(Xgen) = (y1, . . . , yLkey) = Ygen.
Xgen and Ygen are therefore subgroups of Xgroup and Ygroup.
Our public key Kp is then (XP , YP , d, k, Param, Ygen).
Our private key ks is then (Hp).
To guarantee security, Lsig must be long enough so that the probability of having
an other homomorphic function that would mapXgen to Ygen is as low as possible.
In an other variant, the choice of k is done by a RA (Registration Authority) that
would guarantee that a good value is chosen (the RA has also to check that the
Signer is not trying to make to many registrations attempts, the RA would also
needs to sign kp as a guarantee of authenticity and the signature of kp will be part
of the public key).
3.2.3 The signing scheme
To be able to sign a message we first have to map our textual message message
to mess ∈ M with a deterministic function Map : ASCII → M . We will need
a pseudo-random generator PRNGs : M → Xgroup and a homomorphic function
h : Xgroup → Ygroup.
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1. Map(message)→ mess.
2. PRNGs(mess)→ (xmess1 , . . . , xmessLsig ) = Xmess.
3. h(Xmess) = (ymess1 , . . . , ymessLsig ) = Ymess
Then signed message is (message, Ymess).
The signature is therefore Lsig ∗ log2d bits long.
3.2.4 Verification (confirmation)
In this verification phase, the Signer S proves to V the that the signature Ymess is
valid for a message message and a set of keys.
1. S and V computeXgen based on theKp’s value k: PRNGk(k)→ (x1, . . . , xLkey) =
Xgen.
2. S and V then generate Map(message) → mess and PRNGs(mess) →
(xmess1 . . . , xmessLsig ) = Xmess.
3. The protocol finally uses the GHIproof withR = ((Xgen, Ygen)||(Xmess, Ymess)).
3.2.5 Verification (denial)
In this verification phase, the Signer S proves to V that the signature Ymess is
invalid for a message message and a set of keys.
1. S and V computeXgen base on theKp’s value k: PRNGk(k)→ (x1, . . . , xLkey) =
Xgen.
2. S and V then generate Map(message) → mess and PRNGs(mess) →
(xmess1 , . . . , xmessLsig ) = Xmess.
3. The protocol finally uses the co-GHIproof with R = (Xgen, Ygen) and T =
(Xmess, Ymess).
Chapter 4
MOVA Train Tickets
This chapter refers to the actual implementation in Java of the MOVA protocol. The
project offers a Server to generate keys and signatures, and also acts as a Prover, a
Web application that requests signatures to the Server and a Terminal application
that acts as a Verifier.
4.1 Structure
4.1.1 Terminology
The Message is the core of the train ticket containing the information about the
journey that will be performed. The Signature is a valid MOVA Signature in re-
spect to a given message and a key-set. The train Ticket is a SMS containing the
Message and the Signature. The Server is the service that will sign the messages
and then verify their authenticity. The Terminal is the embedded device that the
train controller will have with him and that can establish a connection with the
Server to verify a signature. The WebClient is a web-service that allows people to
buy a train ticket that can establish a connection with the Server to get a message
signed. The Client is the person who will have the SMS ticket and would present
it to the train controller. The Device is either a WebClient or a Terminal.
4.1.2 Usual scenario
In a usual scenario, the customer will purchase his ticket on the MOVAs train
ticket website, which is JPS based generated by WebClient. The WebClient will
then connect to the Server in order to ask him to generate a valid signature for the
given message (text of the ticket). The Client will finally receive the train ticket by
SMS.
In the train, the controller will enter in the Terminal the ticket received by the
Client and the Terminal will connect to the Server which will either confirm or
deny the ticket.
17
18 CHAPTER 4. MOVA TRAIN TICKETS
Figure 4.1: Direction of communication between the three parties
For this implementation we do not send any SMS to the client but for a real
deployment we could use a SMS service provider such as TrueSenses (www.
truesenses.com) to receive tickets request by SMS and then to send the Tick-
ets to the client’s cell phone by SMS.
4.2 Implementation
The implementation is done in 4 different java projects. To use them, one should
have JRE (http://www.java.com/en/download/manual.jsp) and a
tomcat server (http://tomcat.apache.org) installed and running on the
computer.
• the Server Project gives the Server service to the environment. It takes as
argument the port number it has to listen to (if no port specified it will use
the port 5000). Usually only one server should be launched per environment
on a powerful computer so it can handle many simultaneous connections.
• The Terminal Project gives a Terminal service to the environment. It takes
as argument the IP address and port that it should use to connect to the Server
(if not specified, it will use localhost and port 5000). The Terminal project
should be launched on embedded devices with data connection. We can
imagine that every train controller would have this kind of device with him.
• The ClientWeb Project gives the WebClient service to the environment. At
launch the user (it would be the administrator of the web site) must enter the
IP address and the port to connect to the Server. The ClientWeb Project can
be launched at any MOVA Train Ticket partner (such as Swiss or CFF) so
they can offer the service to their clients.
• The MovaShared Project is not a runnable project but contains all the
shared classes of the three other ones. All the classes of MovaShared are
already included in the other projects.
If the Terminal Project or the ClientWeb Project are launched before the Server
project, they won’t be able to connect and will have to be rerun to connect.
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Figure 4.2: UML of the Server Package
4.2.1 Server
At launch the Server will first generate its MOVA signing keys (or load the ones
saved in the files keyPriv.key and keyPub.key) and load the list of all the known
authorized devices (the list is in the file DeviceList.list and points to other files with
the complete information about specific devices). Then Server runs as a demon
(ServerD.class) always waiting for incoming connections on his listening port (by
default 5000). When an incoming connection arrives, the Server verifies if the
Device is in the DeviceList (with its unique ID): if the answer is positive, the Server
replies with an open port number handled by Server.class in a new thread; if the
answer is negative, the Server requests from the Administrator an approval to add
the new Device, creates a DeviceList entry, agrees on a AES secret key and sends
back the unique ID of the Device.
Once connected to the new thread, the Server sends the IV for the AES encryp-
tion (after that, all the following communications are encrypted), then the Device
can request from the Server to send his public key, sign a message or verify a
message. When the interaction is finished, the thread connection is closed and the
thread is killed.
At launch of the Server, there is a User Interface (ServerGUI.class) window
that shows the current Devices IDs with a short history of the interaction with all
of them, a log of the actions of the Server and the ability to ban a specific Device
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Figure 4.3: Screen shot of the Server’s UI
(in case one of them is stolen or cheating). When the Server starts for the first
time, he generates the private and public key that are saved in the keyPriv.key and
KeyPub.key files, so in case of crash or reboot from the Server the same key set can
be used. If the Server for any reason wants to change his key set, the administrator
must shut-down the Server, delete the .key files and relaunch the Server.
In order to to keep track of all the Devices that are authorised to communicate
with the Server, the Server keeps a Hashtable of DeviceList (TerminalList.class)
that contains the unique ID of a Device, the number and type of requests made and
its status. Every DeviceList’s ID is saved into a the deviceList.list file and points
to other files containing the DeviceList data and is read at every launch of the
Server. If the Server for any reason wants to remove the devices, the administrator
must shut-down the Server, delete the deviceList.list file and all the files with the
dl extension, then relaunch the Server. To avoid too many attempts with false
signatures by a Device, after a given number of failed tries (10 for demonstration
purposes) the Device is banned and the administrator must rehabilitate it.
4.2.2 Terminal
The Terminal (Terminal.class) can only do some very simple tasks, it is mainly
here as an interface to the access the Server’s services and keep some personal
statistics. At launch it will request to the Server to receive an ID which will be
used to authenticate at every interaction and they will agree with the DH protocol
on a AES key. The user interface (TerminalGUI.class) is intuitive and effective: it
is constituted by two textboxes, one for the message and one for the signature, and a
verify button which initiates the verification protocol. Once launched, the interface
will display Valid in green if the signature matches the message or display Invalid
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Figure 4.4: UML of the Terminal Package
in red if the message and the signature do not match.
4.2.3 ClientWeb
The ClientWeb runs a singleton instance of the signing service (SignService.class)
that generates objects and text for the JSP pages, and creates an instance of the
client service (Client.class) that will handle the communication with the Server. At
launch the client service will request from the Server to receive an ID which will be
used to authenticate at every interaction and they will agree with the DH protocol
on a AES key. The different lists from the drop down-menu (OptionList.class)
enable the User to generate the text from pre-existing information or the User (for
demonstration purpose) can choose the text he wants (in a real deployment they
should be a database behind the data for the drop-down list).
4.3 Usage
To use the MOVA Train Ticket, one must first launch the Server, which will gen-
erate in the Server.jar folder 4 files with the key extension. The DhKpPub.key is
the DH public key, used for the Semi-static DH key-agreement. This file must be
shared with the Terminal and the ClientWeb (it only has to be done the first time).
To do so, one must insert it in the Terminal.jar file and in the WEB-INF/classes
folder of the ClientWeb.war file. (To edit Jar and War files easily one can use 7Zip
http://www.7-zip.org). Then one has to deploy the ClientWeb.war to the
Tomcat Server, and launch the Terminal.jar on a device.
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Figure 4.5: Screen shot of the terminal’s UI
Figure 4.6: The UML of the MOVA algorithm used by Server and Terminal
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Figure 4.7: UML of the ClientWeb Package
Figure 4.8: Screen shot of the ClientWeb’s UI
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Figure 4.9: Request for approval to add a Device
4.4 Communication Protocols
4.4.1 General
All the communications are initiated by a Device (Terminal or ClientWeb). The
Device sends his ID (-1 if he has no ID yet) in clear, then the Server replies with
the AES IV and the port number on which the communication will then take place.
The following communications all happen in a new Thread on the port number
previously sent:
4.4.2 Diffie-Hellman
At the first launch of the Server, it generates its private a and public A = ga mod p
keys and saves them to a file (dhKpPub.key). (The Administrator must then put this
file in all the devices.) Since the Device has no ID, the GenerateDHKey() method
in the Server.class and Device.class are called.
Client: first the Client loads the Server’s public key (dhKpPub.key and dhKp-
Priv.key), secondly generates his own key-set, thirdly sends his public key to the
Server, fourthly computes the secret key based on his private and the Server’s pub-
lic key, finally derives from the secret key an AES key and the IV.
Server: first the Server loads his private key (dhKpPriv.key), secondly receives
the public key of the device, thirdly computes the secret key based on his private
and the device’s public key, finally derives from the secret key an AES key and the
IV. The Client and the device have now a shared AES key, and the Server send the
ID of the device (in an encrypted way).
In all the future communications, the IV will be generated by a separated Se-
cure random generator.
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4.4.3 Public Key
This protocol is only between the Terminal and the Server. All the communications
are encrypted. The Terminal calls the method getkey() then sends the k command to
the Server. The Server then replies with his public MOVA key that is then displayed
on the Terminal’s UI.
4.4.4 Sign
This protocol is only between the ClientWeb and the Server. All the communica-
tions are encrypted. The ClientWeb calls the method Client.sign(byte[] message)
with the message as parameter, then sends the s command followed by the mes-
sage. The Server then replies with the signature (in boolean) to the ClientWeb (the
signature will been shown to the user in ASCII caracter).
4.4.5 Verify
The protocol is only between the Terminal and the Server. All the communications
are encrypted. The Terminal calls the method verify(byte[] message, String yMess)
with the message and the signature as parameter, then sends the v command, the
message and the the signature (converted to boolean) to the Server; then the Con-
firm protocol (GHID) starts. If at any stage of the protocol an error occurs, the
message null is sent, and then the deny protocol (co-GHID) starts, otherwise the
protocol finishes correctly.
Confirm
The confirm protocol works as described in the previous chapter. If at any stage the
message received or the result return are not as expected, the deny protocol starts.
If the protocol successfully finishes a Valid massage appears on the Terminal and
in the log of the Server. (The wi values chosen by the Terminal and found by the
Server are printed in the java terminal).
Deny
The deny protocol works as described in the previous chapter. If at any stage the
message received or the result return are not as expected, the machine is marked as
cheating and is banned by the Server. If the protocol successfully finishes a Invalid
message appears on the Terminal and in the log of the Server. (The λi values
chosen by the Terminal and found by the Server are printed in the java terminal).
4.5 Implementation
In this section we are going to see more into details how the methods have been
implemented and which settings have been used.
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Figure 4.10: GHID protocol
Figure 4.11: co-GHID protocol
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4.5.1 MOVA
Homomorphism function
In the MOVA original paper several homomorphism functions have been proposed
such as character on Z∗n or RSA, each giving different proprieties and efficiencies.
In this project the priority has been put on efficiency by using the Legendre symbol(
a
p
)
, (with n = pq and p,q prime) which is defined as follow:
∀a ∈ Z?p
(
a
p
)
=
{
1 if a is a quadratic residue modulo p
−1 if a is a quadratic nonresidue modulo p
The Xgroup and Ygroup
Since we have chosen to use the Legendre symbol as homomorphism function the
Ygroup = {-1,1}. In the internal use of the application and while sending messages,
the Ygroup is represented as a boolean mapping 1→ true and −1→ false. When
the signature must be sent in an SMS, it is then converted into ASCII characters.
To avoid confusing some characters (such as ’o’, ’O’, ’0’) have been removed, so
the mapping will only be done by converting 5 bits into 32 different characters. (all
the methods are in ConvertY.class).
The Xgroup are all the elements in Z∗n. We will generate two uniformly random
prime numbers of 512 bit (p and q that will be kept secret,) to then calculate n
(= pq). It is computationally hard to calculate the symbol
(
a
p
)
by only knowing
n since it implies having to find the factorization of n.
Security parameters
Since we only take 5 bits to generate a ASCII character, it is important to use a
small signature. In the MOVA original paper there is proof that, given a 20 bit
signature:
• A Prover must have in his possession the secret key in order to interactively
validate or deny a signature with a probability larger than 2−20.
• If the probability of forging a valid signature is larger than 2−20 then the
forger must have in his possession the secret key.
• If the Advantage of a Distinguisher between a valid and invalid message is
larger than 0 then the Distinguisher has the secret key.
In this implementation, iCon and iDen are set to 20 which means that for a
signature to be accepted or rejected it has to pass the GHID or coGHID protocol
20 times (this represents a probability of 2−20 to pass the protocol when it should
not).
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4.5.2 Hash
The Hash function used in this project comes from Hash.class. It is based on
the Java security library (java.security.MessageDigest), uses SHA-256 and for any
given message, it outputs a 32 bytes digest.
4.5.3 Commitment
The commitment function in this project comes from Commit.class. It takes as
input a message, concatenates it with a 128 random bytes then does a hash function
on it that outputs a digest of 32 bytes (256 bits).
The binding property is given by the collision resistance of our hash function.
With the birthday paradox, an attacker needs to compute 2n/2 (2128) hash opera-
tions to likely find a collision.
The hiding propriety is given by the first pre-image residence of our hash func-
tion. An attacker needs to compute 2n (2256) hash operations to likely find a valid
pre-image.
4.5.4 Legendre
The Legendre symbol is calculated in the Legendre.class file. The method to do
the calculation is (calculate(BigInteger a, BigInteger p)) and applies this formula:
x← a p−12 mod p
(
a
p
)
=
{
1 x = 1
−1 x = −1
4.5.5 PseudoRandom Generator
The Pseudo-random generator and the pseudo-random data are handled in Ran-
domGenerator.class which instantiates a SecureRandom object (part of package
java.security package). It uses a deterministic function with a random seed ;it can
either self-seed getting it from the OS (usually using the timing of I/O events) [1] or
use a seed given in parameter. This implementation uses the java’s recommended
function SHA1PRNG which has a period of 2160.
4.5.6 Diffi-Hellman
The Diffi-Hellman implementation is done in DHAgreement.class following the
Semi-static method. The public key of the Server, generated by the method s1() is
saved into a file and installed in all the devices. The key used to make the agreement
is 1024 bits long.
The methods s1() and s3(byte[], PrivateKey) are called by the Server and the
method d2() is called by the devices.
The implementation is inspired by [10] proposal.
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4.5.7 AES
The AES implementation is done in DHAgreement.class after the secret key has
been generated. The secret key is used as a seed for a SecureRandom that will gen-
erate the AES key (of 128 bits for portability reasons). The messages are then
encrypted /decrypted in the Tcp.class using the AES key generated in the DH
agreement and and the IV set by the Server. The AES is used with CBC mode
of operation and encrypts serialized object into SealedObject.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
With this work, we have first seen some mathematical and cryptographic back-
ground to understand the MOVA scheme, then we have studied the MOVA scheme
and identified its special properties that make this project possible. After all this
being set, we have proposed a real implementation of the MOVA train Ticket ser-
vice.
The Java implementation can prove the viability of such a system and shows
that it can be done with an easy interface to generate, control and administrate train
tickets and related devices.
There might still be some issues to real-world realisation that are not related to
the MOVA security, such as assuring the unicity of a message and that passengers
do not transmit tickets to each other; and the need of permanent data connectivity
for the controller to always be able to verify tickets.
A future work could give deeper look into these problems.
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